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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs have outmaneuvered the legal system. They’ve
discovered the nexus of antiquated copyright laws, paralyzing
social stigma, and unaffordable defense costs. And they exploit
this anomaly by accusing individuals of illegally downloading a
single pornographic video. Then they offer to settle—for a sum
calculated to be just below the cost of a bare-bones defense. For
these individuals, resistance is futile; most reluctantly pay
rather than have their names associated with illegally down-
loading porn. So now, copyright laws originally designed to
compensate starving artists allow, starving attorneys in this
electronic-media era to plunder the citizenry.1
So began U.S. District Judge Otis D. Wright’s scornful order is-
suing sanctions against attorney John Steele and his cohorts at
Prenda Law. Under Steele’s direction, a group of attorneys crafted a
“cloak of shell companies and fraud”2 to perpetrate a sprawling copy-
right infringement litigation scheme.3 Judge Wright’s order, replete
with timely Star Trek references,4 encapsulates the vexing legal,
moral, and ethical problems associated with a legal phenomenon
1. Ingenuity 13 LLC v. John Doe, No. 2:12-CV-8333-ODW (JCx), 2013 WL 1898633, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) (emphasis added).
2. Id. at *1.
3. See id. at *2-3 (describing how Prenda Law carried out its copyright-enforcement
operation); see also Joe Mullin, Prenda Law’s “Hacking” Suit that Named ISPs Ends in Total
Loss, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 31, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/10/
prenda-laws-hacking-suit-against-isps-ends-in-total-loss/ [http://perma.cc/Z9C2-UVET]
(describing how Prenda Law “raked in at least $1.9 million by sending thousands of letters
alleging that Internet users had illegally downloaded pornographic films”). Prenda Law
recently lost its appeal to the Seventh Circuit in spectacular fashion and now faces hefty
sanctions. See Lightspeed Media Corp. v. Smith, 761 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2014); Joe Mullin,
Appeals Court: Shell Game Over, Prenda Law Must Pay Sanctions in Full, ARS TECHNICA
(Aug. 1, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/08/appeals-court-shell-game-
over-prenda-law-must-pay-sanctions-in-full/ [http://perma.cc/3WG8-6SD5] (reporting on
Prenda Law’s legal woes).
4. See Ingenuity 13 LLC, 2013 WL 1898633, at *5 (“Third, though Plaintiffs boldly probe
the outskirts of law, the only enterprise they resemble is RICO. The federal agency eleven
decks up is familiar with their prime directive and will gladly refit them for their next
voyage.”). For all intents and purposes, Judge Wright mortally wounded Prenda Law with his
sanctions order. See, e.g., Ken White, All Across the Country, Prenda Law’s Rubble Is Getting
Bounced, POPEHAT (Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.popehat.com/2013/10/20/all-across-the-country-
prenda-laws-rubble-is-getting-bounced/ [http://perma.cc/DT9T-XTXT].
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known as “copyright trolling.”5 Copyright holders and their attor-
neys who manipulate copyright law and the federal judiciary with
the primary purpose of creating a revenue stream are said to be
“copyright trolls.”6 According to the Norwegian fairy tale “Three
Billy Goats Gruff,” a troll was a creature that hid under a bridge
and coerced payment from unsuspecting travelers.7 Copyright trolls
are not much different, except they usually come armed with a juris
doctorate.8 
Although not all copyright enforcement attorneys are as
unscrupulous as John Steele and his companions,9 copyright trol-
ling—particularly in the context of pornography—is developing into
a cottage industry.10 A defendant in one of these cases is branded as
a “pornography pirate.”11 He can either pay an expensive settlement
to make the charges go away, or roll the dice and defend himself in
federal court.12 The attorneys who “plunder the citizenry”13 by derid-
ing their prey as “porn pirates” are, for all intents and purposes, no
better than privateers of copyrighted pornography.14 
5. James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright
Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 86 (2012) (“A copyright
troll is a plaintiff who seeks damages for infringement upon a copyright it owns, not to be
made whole, but rather as a primary or supplemental revenue stream.”).
6. See id.; see also infra Part III.
7. See GLEN ROUNDS, THREE BILLY GOATS GRUFF (1993).
8. See Joff Wild, The Real Inventors of the Term “Patent Troll” Revealed, IAM MAG. (Aug.
22, 2008), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=cff2afd3-c24e-42e5-aa68-a4b4e
7524177 [http://perma.cc/Z4WG-VHUG] (describing the origins of the term “trolling” in the
context of patent law).
9. See, e.g., Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Doe 1, 945 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(distinguishing Ingenuity on the basis that “there has been no extreme misconduct that would
rise to the level other courts have witnessed”).
10. See Ingenuity 13 LLC v. John Doe, No. 2:12-CV-8333-ODW (JCx), 2013 WL 1898633,
at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) (describing copyright trolling as a cottage industry).
11. See Kashmir Hill, How Porn Copyright Lawyer John Steele Has Made a “Few Million
Dollars” Pursuing (Sometimes Innocent) “Porn Pirates,” FORBES (Oct. 15, 2012, 2:09 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/10/15/how-porn-copyright-lawyer-john-steele-
justifies-his-pursuit-of-sometimes-innocent-porn-pirates/#more-16339 [http://perma.cc/796V-
DXAT]; Greg Sandoval, ISP Won’t Reveal Names of Alleged Porn Pirates, CNET (Dec. 27,
2010), http://www.cnet.com/news/isp-wont-reveal-names-of-alleged-porn-pirates/ [http://
perma.cc/7MJQ-K76Y].
12. See, e.g., Letter from Prenda Law to John Doe (Apr. 23, 2012), available at
http://perma.cc/JV4K-9V3S.
13. Ingenuity 13 LLC, 2013 WL 1898633, at *1.
14. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal
Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 210-11 (2004) (discussing the
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Many law review articles and notes have been written on
copyright trolling.15 Although most authors suggest altering joinder
rules or eliminating copyright protection for pornography alto-
gether, this Note argues that many of the problems associated with
copyright trolling are analogous to abusive debt collection practices.
By adapting the legislation enacted to address abusive debt
collection, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), Congress
can stop copyright trolling by forcing copyright trolls to abandon the
demand-letter-factory business model, or risk facing defensive
litigation brought by the very defendants they are targeting.
This Note takes the position that the actions of these copyright
trolls are not only morally and ethically objectionable, but also pose
a significant burden to the federal judicial system. Part I of this
Note will provide an overview of digital piracy and copyright trol-
ling. Part II of this Note will review the history and policy underly-
ing copyright law and obscenity, and examine how different courts
have decided whether obscene material is entitled to copyright
protection. Part III of this Note will examine copyright trolling
litigation as a business strategy, particularly for producers of
pornography. Part IV of this Note will examine previously proposed
solutions to copyright trolling litigation in the legal literature. Part
IV will also propose that principles from the FDCPA can be readily
applied to the Copyright Act to remedy many current problems
associated with copyright trolling litigation by setting forth model
statutory language. Part IV concludes that amending the Copyright
Act to create legislation that provides (1) a defensive cause of action
for copyright infringement defendants and (2) administrative
enforcement will curtail copyright trolling suits while leaving legiti-
mate copyright infringement actions intact.
I. PIRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Over the last thirty years, the Internet has fundamentally
transformed the landscape of copyright law.16 Perhaps most notably,
widespread access to the World Wide Web has led to an age of mass
definition and historical context of the term “privateer”).
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 695, 696-98 (2011) (discussing the internet and copyright enforcement).
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copyright infringement.17 Any ordinary American with a scintilla of
Internet savvy can access and download hundreds of thousands of
copyrighted digital works in a matter of seconds.18 Although
downloading digital material is not necessarily illegal per se,19 more
often than not Internet users engage in digital piracy by acquiring
copyrighted material without the permission of the copyright
owner.20 Whether digital piracy is actually causing significant harm
to the entertainment industry is a matter of debate.21 Regardless,
the entertainment industry evolved to cope with pervasive digital
piracy.22 Some players in the entertainment industry have adopted
the classic “if you can’t beat them, join them” approach.23 For
example, English rock band Radiohead released their popular 2007
album, In Rainbows, through the band’s own website as a digital
download for which customers could make whatever payment that
17. See Joseph D. Schleimer, Protecting Copyrights at the “Backbone” Level of the Internet,
15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 139, 140 (2008) (“The potent combination of high speed Internet access,
personal computers, and devices such as the iPod, has placed the technology of mass copyright
infringement at the disposal of hundreds of millions of consumers.”). But see Bridy, supra note
16, at 710-11 (challenging the notion of “mass infringement”).
18. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm
Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543.
19. For instance, Apple’s iTunes Store allows Internet users to legally acquire copyrighted
material. As of February 6, 2013, Apple’s iTunes Store has sold over 25 billion songs. See
iTunes Store Sets New Record with 25 Billion Songs Sold, APPLE (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.
apple.com/pr/library/2013/02/06iTunes-Store-Sets-New-Record-with-25-Billion-Songs-
Sold.html [http://perma.cc/NP75-6ZE4].
20. See, e.g., Jennifer Martinez, One-Fourth of Web Traffic is Pirated, POLITICO (Jan. 31,
2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/48494.html [http://perma.cc/YMC3-6C35].
21. Compare STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, POL’Y REP. 189, THE TRUE
COST OF COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY (2007), available at http://perma.
cc/NF55-QCW2 (estimating annual economic loss to U.S. economy to be approximately 12.5
billion dollars), with Luis Aguiar & Bertin Martens, Digital Music Consumption on the
Internet: Evidence from Clickstream Data 2 (Joint Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 2013/04,
2013), available at http://perma.cc/5PU3-YZT8 (finding “no evidence of digital music sales
displacement” due to illegal consumption).
22. The effect of digital piracy on the record industry was eloquently captured by the 2010
American drama film The Social Network. In the film, Sean Parker (an entrepreneur) brags
about the success of Napster. Eduardo Saverin (a co-founder of Facebook) dismisses Parker’s
braggadocio by pointing out that Napster ultimately paid out an exorbitant settlement to the
record industry. Parker responds simply by asking, “Want to buy a Tower Records store?” THE
SOCIAL NETWORK (Sony Pictures 2010).
23. For an interesting discussion on the matter, see Jake Rossen, How Hollywood Can
Capitalize on Piracy, MIT TECH. REV., Oct. 17, 2013, at 95, available at http://perma.cc/9WCF-
GPKA.
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they deemed appropriate, including paying nothing at all.24
However, many others in the entertainment industry have resorted
to litigation.25 Although there are a few prominent examples of
sizeable judgments against defendants in copyright infringement
cases,26 using mass litigation to fight digital piracy has proven to be
an imperfect strategy.27
A. The Napster and RIAA Litigation
In June 1999, Shawn Fanning launched the first mainstream
peer-to-peer (P2P) music file-sharing service: Napster.28 Within nine
months, over 20 million people downloaded Fanning’s program.29
Although Napster revolutionized music distribution,30 it did so at
the expense of artists and record labels whose copyrighted music
was impermissibly shared via Napster.31 A few months later, an
assemblage of record labels sued Napster for contributory and vicar-
ious copyright infringement.32 Metallica, a heavy-metal rock band,
24. Josh Tyrangiel, Radiohead Says: Pay What You Want, TIME (Oct. 1, 2007), http://
content.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1666973,00.html [http://perma.cc/97CY-5CDG].
Fans purchased over 3 million copies of In Rainbows, over 1.75 million of which were physical
compact discs. See Paul Thompson, Radiohead’s In Rainbows Successes Revealed, PITCH-
FORK (Oct. 15, 2008), http://pitchfork.com/news/33749-radioheads-in-rainbows-successes-
revealed/ [http://perma.cc/Z44S-G4BB].
25. See Gregory S. Mortenson, Comment, BitTorrent Copyright Trolling: A Pragmatic
Proposal for a Systemic Problem, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1105, 1108-09 (2013).
26. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 910 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 1584 (2013) (awarding statutory damages of $220,000 for pirating twenty-four
songs via a file-sharing service).
27. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1107 & nn.19-23.
28. See, e.g., Darren Waters, Napster: 10 Years of Change, BBC NEWS (June 8, 2009, 12:23
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8089221.stm [http://perma.cc/95RS-BATT].




31. See id.; see also Amy Doan, Metallica Sues Napster, FORBES (Apr. 14, 2000, 2:30 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2000/04/14/mu4.html [http://perma.cc/4TRY-GMH9] (describing the
legal dispute between heavy-metal band Metallica and Napster); Dr. Dre Raps Napster,
WIRED (Apr. 18, 2000), http://archive.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2000/04/35749 [http://
perma.cc/QJF5-SKTA] (describing a similar legal dispute between rap artist Dr. Dre and
Napster).
32. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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filed suit shortly thereafter for similar claims against Napster.33 The
ensuing litigation ultimately resulted in Napster’s bankruptcy.34
In the years following Napster’s demise, the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA), a trade group for the music
industry,35 launched a series of lawsuits with the intent to curb
digital piracy.36 For years, the RIAA made headlines litigating
copyright infringement suits against individuals caught illegally
downloading copyrighted music.37 In the end, the RIAA gave up
their crusade against copyright infringement.38
The pornography industry is much like the music industry in that
both sell copyrighted material, much of which is distributed elec-
tronically.39 And like the music industry before them, some players
in the adult entertainment industry are readily filing suits against
citizens they believe to have infringed upon their copyrighted
pornographic works.40 Their tactics, however, are very different.
33. See Metallica v. Napster, Inc., No. C 00-4068 MHP, 2001 WL 777005, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2001), aff’d sub nom, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
34. Benny Evangelista, Napster Files for Bankruptcy, SFGATE (June 4, 2002, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Napster-files-for-bankruptcy-2813933.php
[http://perma.cc/586Q-244V].
35. See Who We Are, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php [http://perma.cc/E8RB-
JWGZ] (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
36. See generally How Not to Get Sued for File Sharing, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 1,
2006), https://www.eff.org/wp/how-not-get-sued-file-sharing [http://perma.cc/3VU8-6ZBZ];
Recording Industry Begins Suing P2P File Sharers Who Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music
Online, RIAA (Sept. 8, 2003), http://riaa.com/newsitem.php?id=85183A9C-28F4-19CE-BDE6-
F48E206CE8A1 [http://perma.cc/TUD2-3NEK] (describing the aims of RIAA’s campaign).
37. See, e.g., Troy Carpenter, RIAA Continues Litigation Campaign with 517 Suits,
BILLBOARDBIZ (May 24, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1436936/
riaa-continues-litigation-campaign-with-517-suits [http://perma.cc/MQ93-JLHM].
38. See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 19, 2008, at B1 (reporting on various industry experts’ opinions on why the RIAA
abandoned the campaign); see also Jon Healey, The RIAA Turns Off its Lawsuit Machine, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2008, 3:37 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2008/12/riaa-
lawsuits.html [http://perma.cc/HL78-U747] (opining on the suspension of the RIAA litigation
campaign).
39. See generally Ben Beaumont-Thomas, Sasha Grey: Music Is Just Like the Porn
Industry, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/music/2012/oct/25/
sasha-grey-music-porn-industry [http://perma.cc/F9QR-NRKF] (explaining the similarities
between the adult entertainment industry and the music industry).
40. See infra Part III.
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B. Copyright Trolling in the Pornography Industry
As of March 2012, copyright trolls had targeted over 200,000
anonymous defendants for illegally downloading copyrighted
pornography.41 These copyright trolling suits can be complex, with
one notable suit having nearly 6,000 people joined as co-
defendants.42 However, the copyright holders bringing these suits
rarely litigate the matter beyond the initial pleading stages of
litigation.43 Rather, these plaintiffs seek, and are usually granted,
early discovery requests providing access to the defendants’
identities via their Internet service providers (ISPs).44 
The problem with copyright trolling is that it is not illegal per se,
yet it imposes significant costs not only on defendants, but also on
the federal judiciary, which is inundated with these claims. As one
judge noted, “Courts have been troubled by what amounts to be a
new business model employed by production companies ‘misusing
the subpoena powers of the court, seeking the identities of the Doe
defendants solely to facilitate demand letters and coerce settlement,
rather than ultimately serve process and litigate the claims.’ ”45 
The strategy behind this “demand-letter factory” business model
is simple: it is easier and faster to collect settlement payments from
a large pool of defendants,46 as opposed to targeting a few defen-
dants with protracted RIAA-style litigation.47 This “demand-letter
factory” strategy has proven lucrative for both pornography pro-
41. See Amy Rosen, The Big Lawsuits Keep on Coming: An Analysis of Extortive
Pornographic “Trolling Lawsuits” and Preventive Approaches, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 165, 193-94 (2013); John Doe, Sued for Downloading Porn? One Victim’s Answer, CT
WATCHDOG (Mar. 10, 2012, 7:50 PM), http://ctwatchdog.com/finance/sued-for-downloading-
porn-one-victims-answer [http://perma.cc/Y6YE-DFFV].
42. See W. Coast Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-5829, 275 F.R.D. 9, 11 (D.D.C. 2011).
43. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 166.
44. See, e.g., Combat Zone, Inc. v. Does 1-84, No. 12-30085-MAP, 2013 WL 1092132, at *2
(D. Mass. Feb. 20, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 12-CV-30085-MAP, 2013
WL 1092458 (D. Mass. Mar. 14, 2013) (finding that a copyright troll requested early discovery
for the sole purpose of identifying all Doe defendants by subpoenaing the Defendants’
respective Internet Service Providers).
45. Killer Joe Nevada, LLC v. Does 1-12, No. 1:13-CV-1038, 2013 WL 3458197, at *3 (N.D.
Ohio July 9, 2013) (quoting Third Degree Films v. Does 1-47, 286 F.R.D. 188, 190 (D. Mass.
2012)).
46. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1106-08.
47. See id. at 1109 & nn.32-33.
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ducers and their attorneys.48 These copyright trolls have disrupted
the “under-enforcement equilibrium” that has historically existed in
copyright law.49 Furthermore, because copyright trolls have not
technically broken any laws, there is no “coherent basis on which to
curb their activities.”50 To find meaningful success will require solv-
ing a jigsaw puzzle of interweaving and conflicting legal doctrines.
II. THE TWISTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PORNOGRAPHY,
OBSCENITY, AND COPYRIGHT
Understanding how pornography copyright trolling is possible
requires an examination of the tenuous relationship between the
laws of obscenity and copyright. Because the legal standing of
pornography in the context of copyright law is rather muddled and
complicated, a concise review of copyright law, and its historical
application to pornography, is appropriate. 
A. Copyright at a Glance
The Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution gives
Congress the power “[t]o Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”51 It is
from this constitutional source that the domain of copyright law
flows.52 The Copyright and Patent Clause is notable for being the
only clause in the original Constitution that sets forth a justification
for its allocation of power—namely, to promote the progress of sci-
ence and useful arts.53 Copyright law is designed both to incentivize 
48. See Hill, supra note 11; see also Jane Wakefield, Law Stops ‘Chasing Illegal File-
Sharers,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12253746 [http://
perma.cc/X3E2-HWWR] (describing how a British copyright enforcement firm took a 65
percent share of proceeds earned from settlement letters and litigation). 
49. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L.
REV. 723, 730-31 (2013).
50. Id. at 731.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52. See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The
Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 2 (2002) (“The United States patent and
copyright law derives from congressional authority embodied in the Clause.”).
53. 1 HOWARD A. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:3 (2013) (“This undoubtedly
laudable public purpose thus becomes a value whose consideration is constitutionally
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the creation of new intellectual property, and to protect intellectual
property rights owners’ financial interests in their works.54 Modern
copyright law is formally codified in the U.S. Copyright Act of
1976,55 which lists the kinds of works that qualify for copyright
protection.56 The Copyright Act also sets forth the various remedies
available57 to copyright holders should their exclusive rights58 be
violated.59 Motion pictures, even those of a pornographic nature, are
protected by the Act.60 
When a work is eligible for copyright protection, the owner of the
copyright enjoys “exclusive rights”61 to reproduce the copyrighted
work, prepare derivative works, and distribute copies of the
copyrighted work.62 These rights, however, are limited by competing
public policy interests such as the Fair Use Doctrine.63
Copyright infringement occurs when a nonowner violates any of
the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.64 But in order to have a civil
cause of action against the violator,65 the copyright owner must
register the copyright with the U.S. Copyright Office.66 Copyright
protection begins at creation and endures for the lifetime of the
author, plus 70 years after the author’s death.67 In effect, if infringe-
ment is discovered, the copyright owner can register the work ex
post and subsequently bring suit.68 However, only an owner of the
copyright—either in part or in full—is permitted to bring suit.69
suggested, if not mandated, in any analysis of copyright issues.”). 
54. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1106 (citing Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability
and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1577 (2009)).
55. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2012).
56. Id. § 102.
57. Id. §§ 501-513.
58. Id. § 106.
59. Id. § 501.
60. See infra Part II.B.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
62. See id.
63. See id. § 107. See generally Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair
Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1533-37 (2004).
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 501.
65. Although government may bring a criminal case against infringers who meet certain
statutory triggers, see id. § 506, this Note focuses on civil actions.
66. Id. §§ 408, 501.
67. Id. § 302(a).
68. Id. §§ 411, 501(b); see Rosen, supra note 41, at 167.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 501.
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Although the ownership of a copyright is initially vested in the auth-
or or authors of the work,70 the copyright can be transferred in whole
or in part “by any means of conveyance or by operation of law.”71
The owner of a copyright to a pornographic motion picture can
bring a copyright infringement action if the motion picture is
digitally distributed or copied without the owner’s consent.72
However, there has been some dispute as to whether an obscene
pornographic film is entitled to copyright protection at all.73 If not,
no cause of action for copyright infringement would be available.
B. Obscenity: A Bar to Copyright Protection?
It is unclear whether obscene material is entitled to copyright
protection.74 The most prominent discussion on the matter origi-
nates from the 1979 case Mitchell Brothers Film Group v. Cinema
Adult Theater.75 In Cinema Adult Theater, the Fifth Circuit held
that obscenity was not a defense to copyright infringement.76 The
court found that Congress had not chosen to refuse copyrights on
obscene material,77 and thus asserting that a work was obscene did
70. Id. § 201(a).
71. Id. § 201(d)(1); see also Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1111-12 & n.47.
72. See infra Part III.A.
73. See infra Part II.B.
74. The definition of obscenity is, to put it delicately, a tricky subject. For a general
discussion on the ever-shifting legal standards pertaining to obscenity, see generally
OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, at i
(Maureen Harrison & Steve Gilbert eds., 2000). The current legal standard is the three-prong
Miller Test. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S.
564, 575 (2002). First, the finder of fact must decide whether “the average person, applying
contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest.” Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. Second, the finder of fact must decide whether
the work “depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law.” Id. Third, the finder of fact must decide whether the work, taken
as a whole, “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. Accordingly, the
obscenity analysis is entirely fact-specific. See Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 407-08
(9th Cir. 1982).
75. See 604 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979).
76. Id.
77. Id.; see also Jartech, 666 F.2d at 406 (“Acceptance of an obscenity defense would
fragment copyright enforcement, protecting registered materials in a certain community,
while, in effect, authorizing pirating in another locale.”).
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not constitute “an appropriate defense in an infringement action.”78
Under the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, it is perfectly reasonable that
a copyright troll would be able to enforce their copyright regardless
of whether the pornography is legally obscene.
Nearly twenty years later, Judge Martin of the Southern District
of New York declined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, holding
that obscenity was a defense to copyright infringement.79 In Devil
Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, Judge Martin denied the plaintiff’s
request for an order of seizure and a preliminary injunction against
the defendant’s unlicensed copies of the plaintiff’s copyrighted
pornographic films.80 Judge Martin reasoned that the obscene
nature of the films barred the plaintiff from equitable relief.81
Accordingly, it seems that a copyright troll would face much more
difficulty enforcing a copyright to a pornographic movie in Man-
hattan than in Texas.
Federal law contains no outright prohibition on obscenity; it
leaves this decision to the states.82 Some federal statutes prohibit
obscenity in areas of federal jurisdiction.83 Precedent—particularly
the Miller test—defines obscenity for the purpose of federal law in
the context of these statutes.84 However, the Supreme Court has not
decided whether an obscene pornographic work is entitled to
copyright protection.85 Different circuits may thus have different
78. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d at 863. The court never reached the issue of whether
the pornographic film in question was actually obscene. Id. at 854.
79. Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). But see
Nova Prods., Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc., No. 02 CIV. 3850 (HB), 2004 WL 2754685, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004) (“In its well-reasoned and scholarly opinion, the Fifth Circuit reviewed
the history of the copyright legislation and found that all-inclusive language of the Copyright
Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 34 (1970) (repealed), which encompassed ‘all the writings of an
author,’ did not bespeak of an obscenity exception to copyright protection.”).
80. 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
81. Id. at 177.
82. HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS-95-804, OBSCENITY AND INDECENCY:
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND FEDERAL STATUTES 11 (2009).
83. For a review of relevant federal obscenity statutes, see Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Fighting
the Pornification of America by Enforcing Obscenity Laws, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 15
(2012). See also Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
84. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974); Hatch, supra note 83, at 15
(“We have today arrived at standards for testing the constitutionality of state legislation
regulating obscenity.... These standards are applicable to federal legislation.” (quoting United
States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1973))); see also supra note 74.
85. See Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography: Reconsidering Incentives to Create
and Distribute Pornography, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 75, 82-83 (2008); Rosen, supra note 41, at 168.
2014] APPLYING FDCPA TO COPYRIGHT TROLLING 609
standards, as demonstrated by the holdings in Adult Cinema
Theater and Nectar Video.86 Although much debate has taken place
regarding how the courts and the government should interpret and
enforce obscenity laws,87 there is no controlling authority on
whether pornography—obscene or not—is copyrightable.88 As a
result, copyright holders of pornographic films actively enforce their
copyrights by vigorously pursuing those whom they catch infringing
upon their works.89 The copyright trolls take advantage of the law,
the judiciary, and the salacious nature of their copyrighted works to
cow potential defendants into settling out of court.90 This Note now
turns to how copyright trolls operate, the problems they create, and
what can be done to remedy this situation.
III. COPYRIGHT TROLLING AS A BUSINESS STRATEGY
A copyright troll is an attorney or a firm that specializes in
copyright enforcement litigation.91 A copyright troll invariably seeks
damages for copyright infringement.92 However, the copyright troll’s
quest for damages comes not from a desire “to be made whole, but
rather as a primary or supplemental revenue stream.”93 As will be
discussed later, these attorneys rely on collecting settlement
payments from hundreds of alleged copyright infringers, most of
whom find out they have been sued not through service of process,
86. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
87. Compare Hatch, supra note 83, at 15-17 (“[E]ffective enforcement [of obscenity laws]
requires not only prosecuting more cases, but prosecuting the right cases in the right way.”),
with Amy Adler, All Porn All the Time, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 695, 702 (2007)
(“[P]rosecutors abandoned obscenity law because it presented a mix of vexing institutional
and doctrinal problems.”).
88. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
89. See infra Part III.
90. See infra Part III.
91. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1111 & n.40. For a discussion of major players in the
“copyright trolling” world, see generally Luke S. Curran, Copyright Trolls, Defining the Line
Between Legal Ransom Letters and Defending Digital Rights: Turning Piracy into a Business
Model or Protecting Creative from Internet Lawlessness?, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 170, 176-79 (2013) (discussing Righthaven LLC and Prenda Law, both companies labeled
as copyright trolls).
92. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1111 n.40.
93. DeBriyn, supra note 5, at 86.
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but through a demand letter.94 These fishing expeditions have
proven to be a lucrative revenue stream for attorneys and copyright
owners, with at least one attorney admitting he generated multi-
million dollar revenues from such suits.95 Copyright trolls usually
retain a percentage of the recovered settlement payments and
judgments as their fees, but those who own retain the entirety of the
recovered settlement payments.96
The demand letters that copyright trolls send threaten legal
action should the defendant choose not to settle the dispute out of
court.97 Many of these alleged infringers settle their claims upon
receipt of the settlement letter, even though they may be innocent.98
The alleged infringers may be unable to afford adequate defense
counsel,99 which can cost tens of thousands of dollars more than the
settlement offer.100 They may also settle out of fear of the massive
statutory and compensatory damages available to plaintiffs under
the Copyright Act.101 Or they may simply settle for fear of being
publicly associated with a lawsuit, especially one involving the taboo
of pornography.102 Whatever the case, these demand letters have
proven to be successful enough to sustain an entire industry of
copyright trolls. Although copyright trolling suits are a legal action,
the methodology behind them is purely business.
A. The Copyright Trolling Suit Procedure 
Copyright trolling litigation operates very much like a business.
Because the legal procedures used by various copyright trolls are
94. See Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-90, No. C 11-03825 HRL, 2012 WL 1094653, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012) (noting in a copyright trolling infringement suit that neither the
plaintiff nor any other plaintiff in similar suits have ever served a single defendant in a
copyright trolling litigation suit).
95. See Hill, supra note 11.
96. See id. Whether this profit scheme presents an ethical conflict is outside the scope of
this Note.
97. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1111.
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., Ingenuity 13 LLC v. John Doe, No. 2:12-CV-8333-ODW (JCx), 2013 WL
1898633, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013).
100. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1111.
101. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
102. See, e.g., In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80,
90 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
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virtually identical,103 explanations of how these schemes operate are
rather simple. This Note is not revealing any industry secrets.
Almost every complaint filed by copyright trolls discusses in detail
how they managed to wrangle up their defendants.104 Many opinions
and orders have been written as well on how these suits come into
being, and almost all of them evidence that the following procedure
is being used without significant variation.105
1. The Initial Steps
The first step for a pornography copyright troll is to either find a
client who is willing and able to partake in a copyright troll
litigation scheme,106 or acquire rights to the copyrighted pornogra-
phy.107 The adult entertainment industry is particularly keen on
using copyright trolling litigation.108 The pragmatic explanation
behind the pornography industry’s usage of copyright trolling
litigation is that while no one particularly enjoys being sued,109
being sued for illegally downloading pornographic movies with lewd
titles110 is startling, and more often than not, embarrassing for
alleged copyright infringers.111 The demand letters and pleadings
filed by copyright trolls usually list the titles of pornographic works
allegedly infringed upon,112 which puts pressure on the defendant to
settle in order to avoid the social stigma of being publicly associated
103. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1111. The motivations for this legal strategy are
unclear, although it could be possible that some jurisdictions are more “plaintiff-friendly” than
others. It is also certainly possible that copyright trolls have learned that defendants in more
socially conservative parts of the country would be more likely to settle these unsavory suits.
Or it could be that there are more bona fide infringements in those regions, or that plaintiffs’
counsel are geographically situated in those regions.
104. See infra Part III.A.1-2.
105. See infra Part III.A.
106. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1112 & n.47 (discussing “unbundling” in copyright
law and assignment of parts of a copyright).
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1112.
109. See Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-16, 902 F. Supp. 2d 690, 702 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
110. In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80, 82
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (suing over a movie titled “Gang Bang Virgins”).
111. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1112.
112. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Malibu Media, LLC v. Tashiro, No. 1:13-CV00205-WTL-
MJD, 2013 WL 8291329, at Ex. A (S.D. Ind. Sept. 4, 2013).
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with the aforementioned salaciously titled work.113 Although some
district judges have noted that embarrassment is not a defense to
copyright infringement,114 others have taken a stance against
pornography copyright trolling.115
After acquiring the standing to initiate a suit, a copyright troll
will identify potential defendants via their Internet protocol (IP)
addresses,116 which are usually obtained by hiring a third party that
specializes in electronic sleuthing techniques.117 The proprietary
software used by these companies tracks and records IP addresses
of Internet users suspected of infringing upon copyrighted works,
along with the date and time of the alleged act of infringement.118
After identifying the anonymous infringers, the troll will file a
complaint in federal court and seek joinder of the anonymous
infringers-turned-defendants under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.119 Although joinder has the same inherent benefits
in copyright trolling litigation as in any other form of litigation,120
it is also economically advantageous for the plaintiffs to amass as
many defendants as possible into one suit.121 By joining numerous
anonymous defendants together in a single suit, copyright trolls
avoid incurring the $350 filing fee for each defendant.122 If forced to
sue each anonymous defendant separately, the filing fees alone could
be in the multi-million dollar range.123 There is no clear consensus
in the federal judiciary as to whether joinder for these anonymous
113. See In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. at *90;
Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1112 & n.49.
114. See, e.g., Malibu Media, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 702.
115. See, e.g., Ingenuity 13 LLC v. John Doe, No. 2:12-CV-8333-ODW (JCx), 2013 WL
1898633, at *3-6 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013) (issuing sanctions to plaintiff’s counsel and referring
the matter to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service).
116. An IP address is a unique number that identifies each computer using the Internet.
IP Address, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_
english/IP-address [http://perma.cc/35HG-YWVL] (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
117. See infra Part III.A.2.
118. See infra Part III.A.2.
119. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1113 n.56.
120. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-6, 291 F.R.D. 191, 199-206 (N.D. Ill. 2013)
(discussing whether joinder of John Doe defendants is proper under Rule 20(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332,
344 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2011) (discussing benefits of joinder for numerous John Doe defendants).
121. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1113 & nn.57-58.
122. See id. at 1113 & n.57.
123. See id. at 1113 & n.58.
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defendants is appropriate at the discovery stage.124 Understandably,
this lack of clarity has generated significant debate in legal
literature.125 However, assuming the court grants joinder, the
copyright troll will then proceed to ferret out the true identities of
the anonymous defendants.
2. Finding Anonymous Defendants via BitTorrent
Copyright trolls are able to locate anonymous defendants thanks
in large part to the BitTorrent protocol.126 The BitTorrent protocol
is an Internet technology that makes downloading large files much
faster than with traditional downloading technologies.127 When a
BitTorrent user downloads a file, such as a movie, BitTorrent allows
the user not only to download the movie from the original source,
but also from every other BitTorrent user that has downloaded a
part of the file.128 This network of downloaders is commonly referred
to as a “swarm.”129 This network reduces the burden on the original
source and increases downloading speeds for all of the users.130
BitTorrent became immensely popular in the past decade, account-
ing for as much as 40 percent of the world’s Internet traffic on a
daily basis.131
BitTorrent operates somewhat like a jigsaw puzzle.132 Each file is
broken into many pieces, which are then individually transferred
124. See id. at 1124 & nn.143-45.
125. See infra Part IV.
126. See, e.g.,  Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement and Demand for Jury Trial,
Malibu Media, LLC v. Lutz, No. 2:12-CV-01147-JS-GRB, 2012 WL 6947150, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 2, 2012).
127. See Frequently Asked Questions, BITTORRENT.COM, http://www.bittorrent.com/help/
faq/concepts [http://perma.cc/EJ2H-PNBM] (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
128. See Dylan Love, Everything You Need To Know About BitTorrent, The Legal (And
Illegal) Way To Download Anything You Want, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2012, 11:28 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-bittorrent-2012-4 [http://perma.cc/JJ3F-TTH6].
129. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Lutz, 2012 WL 6947150, at *3 (discussing BitTorrent
terminology and functionality).
130. See Costya Perepelitsa, How Does BitTorrent Work In Layman’s Terms?, FORBES (July
24, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2013/07/24/how-does-bittorrent-work-in-laymans-
terms/2/ [http://perma.cc/XF5V-WKR3].
131. See About BitTorrent, BITTORRENT.COM, http://www.bittorrent.com/company/about
[http://perma.cc/BW26-HHRM] (last visited July 9, 2014).
132. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Malibu Media, LLC v. Tashiro, No. 1:13-CV00205-WTL-
MJD, 2013 WL 1898633, at *3-8 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 4, 2013).
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via the swarm to the end user.133 The BitTorrent software subse-
quently reassembles the puzzle pieces according to digital identify-
ing codes called “hash values.”134 It is through these unique
identifiers, and proprietary forensic software, that computer
investigators hired by copyright trolls are able to identify potential
defendants’ IP addresses.135 Although there are methods of avoiding
detection,136 copyright trolls still manage to target thousands of
potential defendants suspected of infringing upon copyrighted
pornographic works.137
3. Connecting the Dots with Subpoenas
Before a copyright troll can demand payment from the alleged
copyright infringers, it must link the IP addresses acquired via
BitTorrent surveillance to actual people.138 The gatekeepers for this
information are the defendants’ Internet Service Providers (ISPs).139
The ISPs’ records provide the crucial link between the defendants’
IP addresses and their personal information. From these records,
the copyright troll can find the alleged infringers’ real names,
mailing addresses, and e-mail addresses.140 However, due to
compliance costs and privacy concerns for their customers,141 ISPs
133. See Amended Complaint, Lutz, 2012 WL 6947150, at *3-4. See generally Perepelitsa,
supra note 130.
134. See Amended Complaint, Lutz, 2012 WL 6947150, at *3-4. See generally Perepelitsa,
supra note 130.
135. See Amended Complaint, Lutz, 2012 WL 6947150, at *3-4. As will be discussed later,
technology experts have argued that this software is susceptible to recording false positives.
See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1129 n.164; see also Kevin Bauer et al., BitStalker:
Accurately and Efficiently Monitoring BitTorrent Traffic (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://perma.cc/H7E7-RLH9.
136. See Nick Vadala, How to Work Around Comcast’s File-Sharing Crackdown,
PHILADELPHIA.COM (June 1, 2012, 7:30 AM), http://www.phillymag.com/news/2012/06/01/
bypass-riaa-mpaa-bittorrent-crackdown [http://perma.cc/BPR5-L2S9].
137. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 194.
138. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1113-14.
139. See, e.g., Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does 1-11, No. 12CV368-WQH (NLS), 2012 WL 684763,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012) (“Because the transactions in question occurred entirely online,
the defendants have been elusive and the IP addresses and ISP are the only available
identifying information. Without the requested discovery [compelling the ISP to identify the
users behind the IP addresses], there are no other measures Plaintiff can take to identify the
personal information for the Doe defendants.”).
140. See Digital Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
141. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1114 & n.64.
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rarely just hand over their customers’ personal information.
Instead, copyright trolls file ex parte motions in court for expedited
discovery, which force ISPs to release the information.142 Courts
generally grant these ex parte motions, thus allowing the copyright
trolling model to proceed.143 However, a district court judge recently
dismissed a copyright trolling suit on the basis that an IP address
cannot identify a defendant.144 Regardless, this holding seems to be
the exception rather than the rule.145
4. Demand Letter Deluge
Once a copyright troll acquires the previously anonymous
defendants’ personal information, the copyright troll will send a
flurry of demand letters with the intent of reaching as many out-of-
trial settlements as possible.146 These demand letters offer a quick
resolution to the dispute for usually a few thousand dollars, and
predict losses to the defendants’ reputations, finances, and time,
should they refuse the settlement offer.147 If a John Doe agrees to
the settlement offer, the copyright troll will move to voluntarily
dismiss that particular defendant with prejudice from the pending
suit.148 Very few of these defendants go to trial because the plaintiffs
rarely intend to reach a judgment on the merits.149 Rather, the
plaintiffs take advantage of the courts’ subpoena powers to identify
142. See, e.g., Digital Sin, Inc., 279 F.R.D. at 240.
143. See, e.g., AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1-96, No. C-11-03335 JSC, 2011 WL 4502413, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011) (“When a defendant’s identify is not known at the time a
complaint is filed, courts often grant plaintiffs early discovery to determine the doe defend-
ants’ identities.”).
144. See Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 1:14-CV-20213-UU (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2014),
available at http://perma.cc/J3BK-4RED. The court also dismissed the case on the ground that
the copyright troll could not appropriately establish venue. Id.
145. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
146. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1115.
147. For examples of typical settlement letters, including those sent by John Steele of
Prenda Law, see Settlement Letters, etc., DIETROLLDIE, http://dietrolldie.com/settlement-
letters-other-troll-correspondence/ [http://perma.cc/7TY7-CB7Y] (last visited Sept. 27, 2014).
148. See, e.g., Docket Report, W. Coast Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-5829, No. 1:11-CV-00057, 275
F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2011) (go to http://westlawnext.com; then search for 275 F.R.D. 9; then click
on the “Filings” tab).
149. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1115-16 & nn.72-74.
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and coerce payment from their marks.150 The sheer number of
copyright trolling suits substantially burdens the judiciary and
defendants. Although numerous arguments have been made on how
to address the vexing problem of copyright trolling, this Note
proposes to take a fresh look at an old statute: the FDCPA. By
analyzing and adopting the principles set forth in the FDCPA,
Congress can amend the Copyright Act to create a defensive cause
of action for copyright trolling defendants. The new cause of action
would significantly curb copyright trolling by forcing copyright trolls
to abandon the “demand letter factory” model, thus eliminating
copyright trolling’s financial incentive.
IV. A FRESH TAKE ON COPYRIGHT TROLLING
Numerous law review articles and notes have posited various
solutions to solving the problems associated with copyright troll
litigation. Some of the various proposals include lowering the
recoverable statutory damages under the U.S. Copyright Act,151
implementing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions for
improper suits,152 eliminating copyright protection for porno-
graphic works,153 disallowing joinder for John Doe defendants
in copyright troll suits,154 and creating a rule of standing for
non-author plaintiffs.155 Although these proposals have varying
advantages, there are arguments against them as well.156 However,
by looking outside the realm of copyright law and into the realm of
consumer protection law, a framework already exists for combating
the same kind of abusive legal conduct carried on by copyright
trolls: the FDCPA. By implementing a legal framework similar to
the FDCPA, Congress can amend the Copyright Act to halt the
150. See, e.g., Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does 1-32, No. 3:11CV532-JAG, 2011 WL 6182025, at *3
(E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011).
151. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 509-10 (2009). But see Curran, supra
note 91, at 195.
152. See Mortenson, supra note 25, at 1134.
153. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 172-82 (discussing advantages and potential problems
with stripping pornography of copyright protection).
154. See, e.g., Patience Ren, The Fate of BitTorrent John Does: A Civil Procedure Analysis
of Copyright Litigation, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1343, 1376-79 (2013).
155. See Balganesh, supra note 49, at 773-78.
156. See sources cited infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
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abusive behaviors of copyright trolls while leaving copyright
protection intact for those willing to adhere to the original aims of
copyright.
A. Purpose and Function of the FDCPA
Congress enacted the FDCPA in response to copious evidence of
“the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices”
by debt collectors,157 as well as inadequate protections for consumers
at the state and federal level.158 One Senate report noted that this
abuse took many forms, including “obscene or profane language,
threats of violence, telephone calls at unreasonable hours, misrep-
resentation of a consumer’s legal rights, disclosing a consumer’s
personal affairs to friends, neighbors, or an employer, obtaining
information about a consumer through false pretense, impersonat-
ing public officials and attorneys, and simulating legal process.”159
The purpose of the FDCPA was to protect consumers from those un-
ethical practices while leaving ethical debt collectors uninhibited.160
The FDCPA imposes civil liability on debt collectors for certain
prohibited conduct.161 That prohibited conduct includes, but is not
limited to, false or misleading representations as to the collection of
a debt,162 as well as “conduct the natural consequence of which is to
harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collec-
tion of a debt.”163 Creditors, rather than third-party debt collectors,
who originate or acquire a consumer debt prior to any default and
act to collect the debt for themselves, are not required to abide by
the restraints of the FDCPA.164 Furthermore, federal courts have
held the FDCPA is not intended to shield consumers from the
attendant embarrassment and inconvenience of debt collection.165
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012); see 29 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D Cause of Action for Violation of
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 1 § 1 (2005).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
159. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696.
160. Id. at 1-2.
161. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1608 (2010).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
163. Id. § 1692d.
164. See, e.g., 104 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Proof Under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act 1 § 8 (2014).
165. See Dalton v. FMA Enters., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1525, 1531 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Higgins
v. Capitol Credit Servs., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 1128, 1135 (D. Del. 1991); Bieber v. Associated
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The FDCPA provides for private actions, class actions, and
administrative enforcement.166 In private actions, individuals may
collect any actual damages and “such additional damages as the
court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000.”167 For class actions,
recovery includes (1) “such amount for each named plaintiff as could
be recovered [in an individual private action]”168 and (2) “such
amount as the court may allow for all other class members, without
regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser
of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector.”169
FDCPA plaintiffs may also recover attorney’s fees and the cost of
the litigation should their action prove successful.170 However, if a
court finds that an FDCPA plaintiff brought such an action “in bad
faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the
defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work
expended and costs.”171
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is charged with adminis-
trative enforcement of the FDCPA.172 The FTC has issued advisory
opinions intended to clarify and exemplify provisions of the
FDCPA.173 All of the powers granted to the FTC under the Federal
Trade Commission Act are available to enforce compliance with the
FDCPA, including the power to enforce the FDCPA’s provisions in
the same manner as if the violation had been a violation of an FTC
trade regulation.174
Collection Servs., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1410, 1417 (D. Kan. 1986).
166. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.
167. Id. § 1692k(a)(1)-(2)(A).
168. Id. § 1692k(a)(2)(B).
169. Id.
170. Id. § 1692k(a)(3).
171. Id.
172. Id. § 1692l.
173. See Advisory Opinions, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/policy/advisory-
opinions [http://perma.cc/S7F5-YHZY] (last visited July 9, 2014).
174. See 104 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, supra note 164, at § 3. In 2013, the FTC collected
a $3.2 million civil penalty against Expert Global Solutions, the world’s largest debt collection
operation. See United States v. Expert Global Solutions, Inc., 3:13-CV-2611-M, 2013 WL
5870336 (N.D. Tex. July 16, 2013) (proposing a civil penalty and a permanent injunction
against the offending conduct).
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B. Unintended Litigation Under the FDCPA
Section 1692e(5) of Title 15 of the United States Code prohibits
debt collectors from making “[t]he threat to take any action that
cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.”175 Plainly
stated, the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from threatening to
take legal action if the collector does not intend to take such
action.176 The most common collection tactic in this category is the
false or implied threat of a lawsuit.177 The accepted standard for
determining if a debt collector violated the FDCPA is whether the
“least sophisticated consumer” would believe the collectors intended
to take legal action.178 A debt collector would thus be liable under
the FDCPA even if it did not intend to threaten legal action against
a consumer, so long as the “least sophisticated consumer” would
believe that was the debt collector’s intent. However, this lenient
standard does not apply to subsection (5). Rather, the subsection (5)
standard is “whether or not the [debt collector] intended to take the
action threatened.”179 As such, courts have held that subsection (5)
merely requires proof of a fact that amounts to a per se violation of
the statute.180 The least sophisticated consumer standard is
irrelevant in this context.181
Courts have held that form letters issued by debt collectors to con-
sumers containing threats to take legal action, when no such intent
existed, are inherently deceptive and thus violate the FDCPA.182
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) (emphasis added).
176. 2 DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 12:24 (2013).
177. See id.
178. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 276 F.R.D. 174, 177 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (“The underlying purpose of the least-sophisticated-consumer standard is to ensure that
the FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd. This standard is
consistent with the norms that courts have traditionally applied in consumer-protection law.”)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir. 1985).
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See, e.g., United States v. ACB Sales & Serv., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 561, 566, 571-72 (D.
Ariz. 1984). One form letter stated that it was giving the consumer forty-eight hours in which
to act, and that the collector had authority “to proceed with any necessary lawful action,”
creating the clear (but false) impression that the collector would file a lawsuit if the debt was
not paid within forty-eight hours. Id. Another form letter stated that lawsuits are filed “in an
unspecified percentage of cases” and warned that legal costs to the consumer might exceed
the amount of the debt. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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However, the determination of the debt collector’s intent is gener-
ally a question of fact for the jury, rather than a question of law.183
As a result, each case involving a debt collector’s allegedly illegal
threats is determined on a case-by-case basis.184
Subsection (5) is particularly important in the context of copy-
right troll litigation. As many district judges have found, some
copyright trolls do not intend to litigate their infringement suits
beyond the demand letter stage.185 By adopting the statutory
framework of the FDCPA, the Copyright Act can be amended to
curtail the abusive actions of copyright trolls. By creating a
statutory cause of action against copyright trolls who do not intend
to litigate beyond the early discovery stage, copyright trolls will be
dissuaded from relying on the courts as an inexpensive means of
obtaining personal information from the John Does and coercing
payment from them.186 The financial costs associated with litigating
a case to the point of reaching a judgment on the merits will force
copyright trolls to decide whether pursuing litigation is economi-
cally feasible, or risk facing statutory and compensatory damages
for using a “demand letter factory” business model. Under this
proposal, John Steele could be held liable for damages should a
court find that he does not intend to seriously litigate the copyright
infringement actions backing the demand letters he distributes to
hundreds of defendants. This risk will likely reduce the financial
incentive behind copyright trolling, thus creating a rational
economic solution to the copyright trolling dilemma.
C. Practicality of Amending the Copyright Act
The application of the FDCPA to copyright law is remarkably
straightforward. The FDCPA itself was an amendment to the
Consumer Credit Protection Act.187 The conduct of copyright trolls
is in many ways the same kind of abusive, harassing conduct that
spurred the enactment of the FDCPA. Much like unscrupulous debt
183. See Jeter, 760 F.2d at 1176.
184. See, e.g., id.
185. See, e.g., Raw Films Ltd. v. Does 1-32, No. 3:11CV532-JAG, 2011 WL 6182025, at *3
(E.D.Va. Oct. 5, 2011).
186. See, e.g., id.
187. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1692 (2012).
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collectors, copyright trolls are unconcerned with the public’s opinion
of them, and thus do not share creditors’ motivation to avoid
harmful or abusive conduct.188 As such, copyright trolls are distin-
guishable from the creditor exemption under the FDCPA.189 This
new legislation, which could be titled the “Combating Abusive
Copyright Infringement Litigation Act” (CACILA), would enable
citizens to recover any actual damages resulting from copyright
trolls violating the provisions of the act, statutory damages not
exceeding $1,000 for individual actions, and court costs and attor-
neys’ fees for successful actions.190 These damages would create an
economic disincentive for copyright trolls to continue their business
model, while leaving copyright protection intact for those who
seriously contemplate litigation.
D. CACILA: A Model Anti-Trolling Statute
Given the efficacy of the FDCPA, this Note’s proposed anti-
trolling statute, the CACILA, should contain the following provi-
sions, all of which Congress incorporated into the FDCPA191:
(1) Definitions
(A) The term “copyright holder” means any individual, firm,
labor organization, partnership, association, corporation, legal
representative, trustee, trustee in Bankruptcy, or receiver that
owns or represents a person owning a copyright.
(B) The term “settlement agreement” means any legitimately
contemplated or actual settlement agreement pertaining to a
copyright infringement claim.
188. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696
(“Hearings before the Consumer Affairs Subcommittee revealed that independent debt
collectors are the prime source of egregious collection practices. While unscrupulous debt
collectors comprise only a small segment of the industry, the suffering and anguish which
they regularly inflict is substantial. Unlike creditors, who generally are restrained by the
desire to protect their good will when collecting past due accounts, independent collectors are
likely to have no future contact with the consumer and often are unconcerned with the
consumer’s opinion of them. Collection agencies generally operate on a 50-percent commission,
and this has too often created the incentive to collect by any means.”).
189. See id.; 104 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, supra note 164, at § 1.
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (granting civil liability and damages for violations of the
FDCPA).
191. The model statute is based on the FDCPA. The language is changed to apply to
copyright trolls.
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(C) The term “settlement payment” means any actual or
legitimately contemplated debt resulting from a settlement
agreement as defined by this subchapter.
(2) False or Misleading Representations
Any copyright holder may not use any false, deceptive, or
misleading representation or means in connection with the
enforcement of any such copyright. Without limiting the general
application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation
of this section:
(A) The false representation or implication that the copyright
holder is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United
States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or
facsimile thereof.
(B) The false representation of the character, amount, or legal
status of any existing or contemplated copyright infringement
claim; or
(C) The false representation or implication that any individ-
ual is an attorney or that any communication is from an
attorney.
(D) The representation or implication that nonpayment of any
settlement agreement pertaining to a copyright infringement
claim will result in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or
the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or
wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the
copyright holder intends to take such action.
(E) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken
or that is not intended to be taken.
(F) The false representation or implication that the consumer
violated any civil or criminal statute in order to disgrace the
consumer.
(G) Communicating or threatening to communicate to any
person information pertaining to a copyright infringement suit
which is known or which should be known to be false.
(H) The use or distribution of any written communication
which simulates or is falsely represented to be a document
authorized, issued, or approved by any court, official, or agency
of the United States or any State, or which creates a false
impression as to its source, authorization, or approval.
(I) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to
collect or attempt to collect any settlement payment or to obtain
information concerning a party to such a settlement agreement.
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(J) The failure to disclose in the initial written communication
with a person and, in addition, if the initial communication with
the consumer is oral, in that initial oral communication, that the
copyright holder is attempting to collect a settlement payment
and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose,
and the failure to disclose in subsequent communications that
the communication is from a copyright holder, except that this
paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading made in connec-
tion with a legal action.
(K) The false representation or implication that documents
are legal process.
(L) The use of any business, company, or organization name
other than the true name of the copyright holder’s name,
business, company, or organization.
(M) The false representation or implication that documents
are not legal process forms or do not require action by a person
in receipt of such documents.
(3) Civil Liability
(A) Amount of damages
Except as otherwise provided by this section, any copyright
holder who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter
with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount
equal to the sum of—
(i) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result
of such failure;
(ii)(a) in the case of any action by an individual, such
additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding
$1,000; or (b) in the case of a class action, (1) such amount for
each named plaintiff as could be recovered under subparagraph
(a), and (2) such amount as the court may allow for all other
class members, without regard to a minimum individual
recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of
the net worth of the debt collector; and
(iii) in the case of any successful action to enforce the
foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a
reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court. On a
finding by the court that an action under this section was
brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the
court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in
relation to the work expended and costs.
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(B) Factors considered by the court
In determining the amount of liability in any action under
subsection (a) of this section, the court shall consider, among
other relevant factors—
(i) in any individual action under subsection (A)(ii)(a) of
this section, the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by
the copyright holder, the nature of such noncompliance, and the
extent to which such noncompliance was intentional; or
(ii) in any class action under subsection (A)(ii)(b) of this
section, the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the
copyright holder, the nature of such noncompliance, the re-
sources of the copyright holder, the number of persons adversely
affected, and the extent to which the copyright holder’s noncom-
pliance was intentional.
(C) Intent
A copyright holder may not be held liable in any action brought
under this subchapter if the copyright holder shows by a prepon-
derance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and
resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the mainte-
nance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
(D) Jurisdiction
An action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter may
be brought in any appropriate United States district court
without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other
court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date on
which the violation occurs.
(4) Administrative Enforcement192
(A) The United States Copyright Office shall be authorized to
enforce compliance with this subchapter. If any copyright holder
violates any rule under this subchapter respecting false or
misleading representations, then the Office may commence a
civil action against such copyright holder for relief under
subsection (B) of this section in a United States district court or
in any court of competent jurisdiction of a State.
192. If Congress chooses to provide for administrative enforcement of CACILA, it should
do so in the same manner as the FDCPA. Specifically, the relevant agency should both: (1)
issue advisory opinions in order to provide both guidance and notice to copyright holders on
various compliance issues, and (2) have an adequately vigorous enforcement arm to both deter
copyright trolling and mitigate the burden of private litigation. The model language in section
4 demonstrates how Congress could accomplish these goals through legislative enactment.
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(B) The court in an action under subsection (A) of this section
shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the court finds
necessary to redress injury to persons resulting from the rule
violation or the false or misleading representation, as the case
may be. Such relief may include, but shall not be limited to, the
relief made available to private and class action plaintiffs in
section (3)(A) of this subchapter.
(C) Advisory opinions of the Office
No provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to
any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any
advisory opinion of the Office, notwithstanding that after such
act or omission has occurred, such opinion is amended, re-
scinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be
invalid for any reason.
Although the FDCPA is far more intricate and complex than the
foregoing model language, this Note’s proposal covers the essential
components of an effective anti-trolling statutory scheme by
creating both (1) a private defensive cause of action, and (2)
administrative power to enforce CACILA absent a defendant’s
willingness to bring a private cause of action. The following Section
addresses potential counterarguments associated with this legisla-
tive reform.
E. Counterarguments Addressed
There are some drawbacks to this approach. Although the
Copyright Act has been amended numerous times since its enact-
ment in 1976,193 drafting and implementing new legislation is easier
said than done. Congressional gridlock in Washington presents a
formidable roadblock to any new legislation, let alone an amend-
ment to the Copyright Act.194 Speaker of the House John Boehner
joked that Congress currently could not vote to make Mother Teresa
a saint.195 Despite the practical problems associated with passing
193. See generally 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:83-1:117 (2013).
194. See Frank Islam & Ed Crego, Braking Bad: The Critical Need to End Congressional
Gridlock, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2013, 5:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-
islam/braking-bad-the-critical-_b_4167947.html [http://perma.cc/8DW5-HTPF].
195. Russell Berman, Boehner Jokes Congress Couldn’t Vote to Make Mother Teresa a
Saint, THE HILL (Feb. 6, 2014), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/197644-boehner-jokes-
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new legislation, amending the Copyright Act presents a universal
solution to the burdensome litigation tactics employed by copyright
trolls—particularly in the realm of pornography. Although severing
joinder in these suits would create financial disincentives for
copyright trolls, district judges have exercised discretion in deciding
whether to actually do so.196 Stripping pornography of copyright
protection necessarily invites questions of constitutionality,197 and
reforming recoverable statutory damages for copyright infringement
presents its own cadre of problems.198 But by using the FDCPA as
precedent, Congress can enact legislation to close the legal loophole
currently being manipulated by copyright trolls.
In addition to enactment concerns, critics of this Note’s proposal
could also argue that public embarrassment or financial constraints
would limit the willingness of potential plaintiffs to file suit under
the proposed legislation. As previously discussed, a primary reason
why so many copyright trolling defendants choose to settle, rather
than litigate, is fear of being publicly branded as a pornography
pirate.199 Likewise one could plausibly argue that the same societal
pressures would limit the defendants’ willingness to bring suit
under the proposed defensive cause of action. Moreover, critics could
reasonably assert that many of these potential plaintiffs would lack
the financial resources necessary to bring litigation.200 However, like
the FDCPA, the proposed legislation could mitigate these concerns
by providing government enforcement powers.
The FTC may bring enforcement actions against a defendant
accused of violating the FDCPA’s debt collection provisions under its
Federal Trade Commission Act powers.201 This agency enforcement
power exists alongside the private cause of action provided by the
FDCPA. The FTC’s enforcement power is substantial. For example,
the FTC successfully collected a multi-million dollar settlement and
congress-couldnt-vote-to-make-mother-theresa-a-saint [http://perma.cc/U7QQ-C5CB].
196. See Ren, supra note 154, at 1370-76 (discussing various courts’ responses to joinder
questions in these suits).
197. See Rosen, supra note 41, at 180.
198. See id. at 187-88. But see Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 151, at 509-10
(discussing advantages of altering the Copyright Act’s statutory damage regime).
199. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
201. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(a), 1692l(a) (2012).
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obtained permanent injunctions against a third-party debt collector
in 2013.202
Under this Note’s proposed legislation, Congress could similarly
assign enforcement powers to both private actors and a federal
independent agency. For the purposes of this Note, the U.S.
Copyright Office shall assume responsibility for enforcement of the
proposed legislation. Although civil copyright infringement is
currently limited to private actions,203 Congress could legitimately
grant the Copyright Office enforcement powers under the Copyright
Clause,204 or alternatively create a separate enforcement division at
the FTC under its expansive Commerce Clause powers.205 In either
case, agency enforcement of the proposed legislation would effec-
tively mitigate the previously expressed financial and societal
concerns related to private actions.
Another possible concern in creating a defensive cause of action
against copyright trolls is that the possibility of retaliatory litigation
would “chill” plaintiffs from legitimately prosecuting their copy-
rights. However, by seriously pursuing litigation—rather than
sending out demand letters without any intent to go to trial—legiti-
mate copyright infringement plaintiffs will easily avoid violating the
provisions of the act. Furthermore, the cause of action would be
subject to the same standards as other pleadings, meaning that an
attorney bringing a defensive cause of action would be subject to
Rule 11 sanctions should the complaint be found to be without
merit.206 It seems reasonable that the only “chilled” plaintiffs would
be copyright trolls.
Critics could also point out that the underlying aims of consumer
protection law and copyright law are fundamentally different, which
could lead to a “translation” issue in applying FDCPA principles to
an anti-trolling statutory amendment. As previously discussed, the
202. See United States v. Expert Global Solutions, Inc., 3:13-CV-2611-M, 2013 WL 5870336
(N.D. Tex. July 16, 2013).
203. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012). However, the government may bring a criminal copyright
infringement case against persons who violate § 506. See also 120 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS
3D 181 (2011) (providing useful commentary on criminal copyright infringement proceedings).
204. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332.
205. For detailed discussion of the interplay between Congress’s Commerce Clause powers
and copyright regulation, see generally Kevin J. Hickey, The Copyright/Commerce Clause
Collision: A Subject Matter Approach, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2013).
206. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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underlying constitutional goal of copyright law is to promote the
progress of science and useful arts.207 Stated otherwise, copyright
law was crafted to incentivize the creation of knowledge.208 In the
context of pornographic copyright trolling, copyright law is not
advancing the progress of science or the useful arts. Rather, it is
providing a legal loophole for copyright trolls to take advantage of
an antiquated legal doctrine to create a cottage industry built on a
foundation of fear, shame, and smut.
Admittedly, Congress did not pass the FDCPA to promote the
progress of science and useful arts.209 But Congress’s four reasons
for passing the FDCPA210 all apply to copyright trolling. First,
Congress found that abusive debt collection practices caused
personal bankruptcies, marital instability, unemployment, and
invasions of privacy.211 Pornographic copyright trolling assuredly
has at least some of the same adverse social and economic effects.
Second, Congress noted that existing laws inadequately protected
consumers.212 As previously discussed, the current framework for
copyright law fails to protect citizens from abusive copyright trolling
litigation. Third, Congress recognized the existence of alternative,
non-abusive methods of debt collection.213 Copyright holders may
similarly protect their exclusive rights in a non-abusive manner.
Fourth, Congress found that abusive debt collection practices
directly and indirectly affected interstate commerce,214 thus giving
Congress the constitutional “hook” to pass the FDCPA. Because
Congress may regulate copyright law under its power to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts, this “hook” is not
necessary.215 Even if it were, it is reasonable to infer that copy-
right trolling directly and indirectly affects interstate commerce.
207. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
209. The goal of the FDCPA was “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to
protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).
210. Id. § 1692(a)-(d).
211. Id. § 1692(a).
212. Id. § 1692(b).
213. Id. § 1692(c).
214. Id. § 1692(d).
215. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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Congress clearly has the power to amend the Copyright Act to
combat copyright trolling.
Analogous to the FDCPA, the proposed amendment comports
with the underlying aim of promoting the progress of science and
the useful arts because the amended law would continue to protect
copyright owners who refrain from partaking in abusive copyright
trolling litigation. The amended law merely accounts for an
important competing policy interest of protecting citizens from
abusive copyright trolling practices. As previously discussed, the
Copyright Act is amenable to evolving to account for such competing
policy interests. Copyright law was never intended to facilitate a
litigious business model for pornographers. Accordingly, Congress
can and should amend the Copyright Act to dismantle the copyright
trolling industry once and for all.
CONCLUSION
John Steele and other copyright trolls have outmaneuvered the
federal court system, demonstrating fundamental shortcomings in
the final frontier of American copyright enforcement law. Although
much discussion has already been devoted to developing solutions
for the copyright trolling litigation problem, many of these proposals
come with fatal flaws that prevent meaningful implementation.
Moreover, they ignore the motivation behind copyright trolling
litigation: creating an auxiliary revenue stream for copyright
holders. This subverts the basic premise of copyright law, namely,
to promote the progress of science and useful arts.
This Note has argued that amending the Copyright Act to
incorporate policies and principles found in the FDCPA can
effectively combat copyright trolling. Although consumer credit
protection and copyright are two distinct areas of law, many of the
same problems posed by unscrupulous debt collectors, subsequently
remedied by the FDCPA, are readily identifiable in copyright
trolling litigation. The statutory framework of the FDCPA does not
prohibit debt collection entirely, nor does it create a cause of action
for embarrassment or shame associated with debt collection. Rather,
it prohibits a set of abusive and harassing behaviors carried out by
debt collectors. Much in the same way, the Copyright Act can be
amended to prohibit copyright trolls from implying an intention to
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take legal action when no such intention exists. Creating a cause of
action for statutory and compensatory damages for citizens harmed
by copyright trolls under this new legislation would make this
demand-letter-factory business model financially risky and unfeasi-
ble, thereby drastically reducing the number of copyright trolling
litigation suits filed in federal court.
Although drafting and enacting new legislation is a lengthy and
complex process, particularly in today’s political climate, amending
the Copyright Act to allow for this proposed statutory cause of
action would avoid many of the hurdles present in other proposed
solutions. As long as the business model behind copyright trolling
litigation continues to prove successful, copyright trolls will take up
arms. Creating a statutory cause of action to allow John Does to
push back against coercive demand letters would force copyright
trolls to play their hand or fold. This cause of action would not only
provide a remedy for thousands of citizens embattled by John Steele
and his counterparts, but would also destroy the financial incentive
driving copyright trolling litigation in the first place.
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